Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle by Rai, Arti K. & Kumar, Sapna
Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle 
Sapna Kumar* & Arti Rai** 
Synthetic biology takes as its mission the construction, and 
“reconstruction,” of life at the genetic level.1  The scale and ambition of 
synthetic biology efforts go well beyond traditional recombinant DNA 
technology.  Rather than simply transferring a preexisting gene from one 
species to another, synthetic biologists aim to make biology a true engineer-
ing discipline.2  In the same way that electrical engineers rely on standard 
circuit components, or computer programmers rely on reusing modular 
blocks of code, synthetic biologists wish to create an array of standard, 
modular3 gene “switches” or “parts” that can be readily synthesized and 
mixed together in different combinations.4  The Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) has a “Registry of Standard Biological Parts [that] 
supports this goal by recording and indexing biological parts that are 
currently being built and offering synthesis and assembly services to con-
struct new parts, devices, and systems.”5  Systems, devices, parts, and DNA 
represent descending levels of complexity—systems consist of devices, and 
devices consist of parts composed of DNA.6 
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1. See, e.g., Drew Endy, Foundations for Engineering Biology, 438 NATURE 449, 449 (2005) 
(observing that the era of synthetic biology has been described as an era in which significantly new 
gene arrangements can be constructed and evaluated). 
2. See id. (arguing that the recent interest in synthetic biology is driven in part by engineers who 
want to develop foundational technologies that make the design and construction of engineered 
biological systems easier). 
3. Modularity involves “breaking up a complex system into discrete pieces—which can then 
communicate with one another only through standardized interfaces within a standardized 
architecture . . . .”  Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 19, 19 (2002). 
4. See Endy, supra note 1, at 450 (asserting that the biological engineering community would 
benefit from the promulgation of standards for basic biological parts, as well as standards for using 
the parts in combination). 
5. Help: About the Registry, http://parts.mit.edu/registry/index.php/Help:About_the_Registry 
(last modified Apr. 5, 2006). 
6. Abstraction Hierarchy - Registry, http://parts.mit.edu/registry/index.php/Abstraction_ 
Hierarchy (last modified June 7, 2006). 
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The idea behind the Registry of Standard Biological Parts (Registry) is 
that these parts can, and should, be recombined in different ways to produce 
many different types of devices and systems.7  Although the Registry cur-
rently contains physical DNA, its developers believe that, as DNA synthesis 
technology becomes capable of generating ever-longer sequences, the 
Registry will be composed largely of information and specifications that can 
readily be fabricated in DNA synthesizers.8  The fabricated, DNA-based 
functions would then be “executed” in a cell. 
Synthetic biology’s long-term goals encompass such far-reaching 
possibilities as constructing an entirely artificial programmable genome from 
standard parts.  Scientists in the closely allied field of synthetic chemistry are 
working on artificial RNA and proteins with added amino acids, presumably 
linked through an artificial genetic code.9  More immediately, synthetic 
biology “systems”—that is, organisms engineered with artificial metabolic 
pathways composed of a number of different standard parts—have produced 
important concrete results, including the possibility of unlimited supplies of 
previously expensive drugs for malaria.10  Proponents hope to use synthetic 
organisms for economical production of not only medically relevant chemi-
cals but also a large variety of industrial materials.11  The possibility of low-
cost production of “green” fuels such as cellulosic ethanol has particularly 
caught the attention of prominent venture capitalists.12  Even more apparently 
whimsical applications, such as programming bacteria to take photographs13 
or to form visible patterns14 may be useful for detection of environmental 
pollutants.  Similarly, programming cells to implement digital logic could 
have large numbers of medical and computational applications.15 
 
7. Help: About the Registry, supra note 5. 
8. See David Baker et al., Engineering Life: Building a Fab for Biology, SCI. AM., June 2006, at 
44, 46 (2006) (“[The] combination of technology and methodology for designing and fabricating 
semiconductor chips . . . is a valuable model for another nascent technology sector: fabrication of 
biological systems.”). 
9. Steven A. Benner, Act Natural, 421 NATURE 118, 118 (2003). 
10. See Vincent J.J. Martin et al., Engineering a Mevalonate Pathway in Escherichia Coli for 
Production of Terpenoids, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 796, 800 (2003) (reporting the 
development of an Escherichia coli (E. coli) microbial host to facilitate large-scale development of 
an antimalarial drug). 
11. See generally BIO-ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, GENOME SYNTHESIS AND DESIGN 
FUTURES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY 71–91 (2007) (assessing the impact of bio-based 
technologies on the chemical industry). 
12. See, e.g., Michael S. Rosenwald, Tackling the World’s Energy Problems, WASH. POST, Feb. 
27, 2006, at D1 (reporting the founding of Synthetic Genomics, Inc. to use microorganisms to 
produce alternative fuels, with the venture capital backing of a prominent Mexican billionaire). 
13. Anselm Levskaya et al., Engineering Escherichia Coli to See Light, 438 NATURE 441, 441 
(2005). 
14. Subhayu Basu et al., A Synthetic Multicellular System for Programmed Pattern Formation, 
434 NATURE 1130, 1130 (2005). 
15. See Endy, supra note 1, at 449 (discussing applications of synthetic biology, such as 
programmed cells that can “count up to 256 in response to a generic input signal” and could be used 
in “the study and control of cell division”). 
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At the same time, synthetic biology has engendered numerous policy 
concerns.  From its inception, commentators have raised issues ranging from 
bioethical and environmental worries to fears of bioterrorism.  The successful 
in vitro creation of a complete polio virus genome “using mail-order 
segments of DNA and a viral genome map that is freely available on the 
Internet” provided a focal point for these concerns.16  The worry has been 
sufficiently great that the synthetic biology community recently released a 
declaration publicly committing itself to improving the software that checks 
DNA synthesis orders for sequences encoding hazardous biological 
systems.17 
There is, however, one area that has been largely unexplored by legal 
scholars until this point—the relationship of synthetic biology to intellectual 
property law.  Nonetheless, scientists working in this area are sufficiently 
concerned about the possible impact of intellectual property that they are ac-
tively thinking about the applicability of “open source”-type strategies to 
parts and devices.18  Three key issues deserve further attention. 
First, synthetic biology, which operates at the intersection of 
biotechnology, software, and electronics, presents a particularly revealing 
example of the challenge that arises when a new technology has to be 
assimilated into existing intellectual property law.  The manner in which the 
law has handled software on the one hand and biotechnology on the other 
may not bode well for synthetic biology.  Already we are beginning to see 
problematic foundational patents that could impede the potential of the 
technology.  Moreover, even assuming appropriate enforcement of 
foundational patents, a proliferation of patents on basic parts and devices 
could create transaction-cost-heavy thickets or “anticommons.”  Both foun-
dational patents and patent thickets are likely to be particularly problematic 
to the extent they cover standards that synthetic biologists would like to 
establish. 
Second, synthetic biology illustrates a tension between different 
methods of creating “openness.”  On the one hand, we have intellectual 
property law’s insistence that certain types of material remain in the public 
domain, outside the world of property.  On the other, we have the attempt by 
individuals to use intellectual property rights to create a “commons,” just as 
developers of free and open-source software use the leverage of software 
copyrights to impose requirements of openness on future programmers—
requirements greater than those attaching to a public domain work.  
Intellectual property policy specifies items, such as abstract ideas or 
 
16. Phillip Ball, Starting from Scratch, 431 NATURE 624, 624 (2004). 
17. Declaration of the Second International Meeting on Synthetic Biology (May 29, 2006) 
(revised public draft), http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/1721.1/32982/1/SB.v5.pdf. 
18. See Matthew Herper, Architect of Life: Drew Endy Aims to Reinvent the Biotechnology 
Industry, FORBES, Oct. 2, 2006, at 63, 63 (reporting that Drew Endy, a leader in the synthetic 
biology field, advocates that scientists voluntarily place biological components in a freely accessible 
registry). 
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compilations of unoriginal facts,19 that cannot be covered by intellectual 
property rights precisely in order to leave them open to all.  Yet many of the 
techniques of open source require property rights so that future users and 
third parties will be bound by the terms of the license.20  Should we rethink 
the boundary lines between intellectual property and the public domain as a 
result? 
Third, synthetic biology illustrates a potentially symbiotic relationship 
between open and proprietary innovation models.  Several of the firms that 
are prominent in the area of large-scale gene synthesis have significant pro-
prietary positions.  Notably, these proprietary positions are likely to be 
enhanced, not diminished, by the widespread availability of the information 
necessary for making parts, devices, and systems.  For example, once the 
parts collected in the MIT Registry begin to be disseminated as pure 
information, widespread dissemination of this information will likely 
increase demand for the various proprietary DNA synthesis platforms.  
Whether this symbiosis is beneficial from a social welfare standpoint may 
depend on whether large-scale gene synthesis remains a competitive enter-
prise or falls under monopoly control. 
Part I of this Article introduces the background law against which 
patenting in the area of synthetic biology operates.  Part II discusses the 
current landscape of proprietary rights in the area of synthetic biology.  
Specifically, we focus on foundational patents, patents on DNA-binding 
proteins, and proprietary rights relevant to large-scale DNA synthesis.  With 
respect to each set, we address possible benefits and costs.  Part III identifies 
the obstacles that might be faced by those who might wish to use property 
rights to create openness.  Part IV examines interactions between open in-
formation about parts and the highly proprietary business model of gene 
synthesis firms. 
I. Synthetic Biology: Difficulties in Background Law 
Intellectual property law has already had some difficulty incorporating 
two of the technologies from which synthetic biology draws inspiration—
biotechnology and software.  In certain areas of biotechnology, the U.S. 
 
19. It bears emphasis, however, that within patent law, the scope of the “abstract ideas” 
exception to patentability has progressively been narrowed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.  See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2928 (2006) 
(per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the Federal Circuit has held inventions 
patentable if they produce a “useful, concrete, and tangible result,” although the Supreme Court has 
“never made such a statement, and if taken literally, the statement would cover instances where this 
court has held the contrary”).  Although the Supreme Court was poised to decide this question in 
Laboratory Corp., a majority of the Court subsequently decided that the issue had not been squarely 
presented.  Id. at 2921. 
20. See Andrés Guadamuz González, Open Science: Open Source Licenses in Scientific 
Research, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 321, 327 (2006) (describing open-source freedoms such as access to 
software source codes as “protected by the adoption of a restrictive licensing model that makes use 
of existing copyright legislation”). 
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears most patent appeals, 
has tended not to enforce the patent law requirement that inventions be 
“nonobvious” to the ordinary scientist working in the area.21  Years after 
methods for cloning genes became routine and widely known, the Federal 
Circuit continues to treat the gene products of such methods as patentable.22  
On the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, what matters is not whether a practicing 
biologist would find a particular invention obvious but, rather, rules about 
nonobviousness developed for chemical inventions in the mid-twentieth 
century.23  Moreover, although economic arguments can be made for the low 
nonobviousness standard with respect to certain genetic sequences (for 
example, genetic sequences that represent therapeutic proteins), a per se rule 
of minimal nonobviousness in such technology is far from optimal 
economically.24  So one major part of the technological terrain into which 
synthetic biology must fit—biotechnology—has already proven difficult for 
intellectual property law to manage. 
While biotechnology has mainly posed difficulties for patent law, 
software has posed both copyright and patent problems.  Copyright covers 
original works of expression.25  It explicitly excludes works that are 
functional.26  Patent law covers inventions that are useful, novel, and 
nonobvious—functionality is a requirement, not an impediment.27  However, 
it had traditionally been understood to exclude formulas and algorithms.28  
Thus, software seemed to fit neither the copyright nor the patent box.  It was 
too functional for copyright; too close to a collection of algorithms and ideas 
for patent.  Additionally, certain economic aspects of software, including its 
high propensity to display network effects that militate in favor of 
standardization, led scholars to believe that neither copyright nor patent was 
well suited for encouraging innovation without unduly discouraging 
 
21. See Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New 
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 834 (1999) (noting that under the court’s logic, “DNA 
sequences can be nonobvious no matter how easy or routine it is to isolate the sequences”). 
22. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The fact that one can conceive a 
general process in advance for preparing an undefined compound does not mean that a claimed 
specific compound was precisely envisioned and therefore obvious.”). 
23. See Rai, supra note 21, at 835 (noting that the court’s argument is “based on its view that 
DNA-based technology is simply a subset of chemical technology generally,” making the structural 
similarity test apply equally well to biotechnology); see also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1382 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Unfortunately this court has deprived the Patent Office of the 
obviousness requirement [of 35 U.S.C. § 103] for genomic inventions.”). 
24. See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent 
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1070–73 (2003) (discussing problems created by a 
nonobviousness standard that is uniformly low). 
25. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
26. Id. § 102(b). 
27. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2000). 
28. See Rai, supra note 24, at 1104 (“With respect to algorithms, this prior precedent suggested 
that algorithms were patentable only to the extent that they were embodied in a physical element, in 
the case of a product patent, or applied to a physical process, in the case of a process patent.”). 
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competition; various sui generis intellectual property regimes were proposed 
as an alternative.29 
Ultimately, as a result of actions by Congress and by the Federal 
Circuit, software ended up being covered by both copyright and patent.30  
Moreover, the historical refusal of some members of the Federal Circuit to 
allow patent examiners to use unwritten common knowledge in the field to 
determine that prior art references could be combined to render a patent ap-
plication obvious31 may have had a significant impact on software.  As in 
other fields, it may have been difficult for a patent examiner to find specific 
written references testifying to information that is generally known.32  
Additionally, although the Supreme Court’s recent decision in KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.33 rejects a formalistic requirement of a 
written “suggestion to combine,”34 potential infringers bear the burden of 
challenging patents issued under the prior standard.  Scholars have also 
argued that the Federal Circuit has allowed unduly broad patents to issue in 
the area of software.35 
 
29. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 1329, 1331 (1987) (arguing that economics analysis militates in favor of protection specific to 
software); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2312 (1994) (suggesting a sui generis approach to legal 
protection of computer programs). 
30. See Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (codified 
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117) (extending in a formal way copyright protection to software); 
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(holding that software is considered patentable if it involves some practical application and “it 
produces ‘a useful, concrete and tangible result’”); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (designating software that turns a general purpose computer into a special purpose computer 
as patentable subject matter). 
31. In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
32. Various groups now focus on documenting software-related information.  See, e.g., Open 
Source as Prior Art, http://www.osapa.org (developing practices for electronic publication of 
software prior art to make it more available to developers and patent examiners); The Software 
Patent Institute, Mission and Endorsements, http://www.spi.org/missendo.htm (describing its 
mission as “assisting the United States Patent and Trademark Office and others by providing 
technical support in the form of educational and training programs and providing access to 
information and retrieval resources concerning software prior art”). 
33. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). 
34. See id. at 1741 (“The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception 
of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of 
published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.”). 
35. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1171 (2002) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has proven remarkably unwilling 
to require software patentees to disclose details.  As a result, we should expect the first programmer 
to implement a new idea in software to claim the entire category of software . . . .”).  One recent 
panel opinion, LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344–47 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005), suggests that at least some members of the Federal Circuit are not inclined to give all 
software patents broad scope.  The extent to which future Federal Circuit opinions will follow 
LizardTech remains to be seen.  In contrast, the Federal Circuit has generally required patents in the 
biopharmaceutical area to be narrower.  See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 
F.3d 916, 924–28 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (detailing the level of specificity required in a patent 
specification in “the chemical arts”).  It is not clear, however, how assiduously the PTO is following 
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II. The Proprietary Landscape: Content and Implications 
How does this history of intellectual property law’s struggles to deal 
with software and biotechnology bear on synthetic biology?  As a threshold 
matter, it bears emphasis that more than 5,000 granted U.S. patents currently 
cover ordinary DNA sequences.36  This large number is a consequence, at 
least in part, of the low nonobviousness standard established by the Federal 
Circuit.  In contrast, in the European Union, where the nonobviousness stan-
dard is higher, there are only about one-seventh as many patents on DNA 
sequences.37  Just as many types of gene-related research may infringe at 
least some DNA sequence patents, so too may research in synthetic biology. 
We also considered patent activity in three research contexts specific to 
synthetic biology.38  These three contexts are foundational patents on the ba-
sic science of synthetic biology, patents on DNA-binding proteins, and 
patents on large-scale gene synthesis.  In general, because the field of syn-
thetic biology is quite new (and has not, in contrast to nanotechnology, 
caught the attention of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)39), patent 
classification categories are quite unsuited to the identification of synthetic 
biology patents.  Thus, finding patents in each of these areas represented a 
search challenge.  Below we describe our search strategy in each area and 
analyze the patents that we found. 
A. Foundational Patents 
We categorized as foundational those patents with broad claims that 
appeared important to a large percentage of work in the area.  We identified 
such patents through discussions with members of the synthetic biology 
community and through our patent searches in the area of DNA-binding 
proteins and large-scale gene synthesis.  Because synthetic biology is in a 
relatively inchoate state, the identification of foundational patents is 
 
the Federal Circuit’s mandate.  See Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper 
Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the Courts and 
PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 63–64), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=937374 (concluding that the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
rarely denies claims for lack of a written description). 
36. Michael M. Hopkins et al., DNA Patenting: The End of an Era?, 25 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 185, 185 (2007). 
37. See id. at 185 (noting that only 750 DNA patent families contain granted European Patent 
Office (EPO) patents and attributing the difference in part to the higher patentability bar in the 
EPO). 
38. We focused on synthetic biology that relies upon existing bases and the existing genetic 
code, and thus, has relatively near-term application.  Thus, for example, we do not include in our list 
of foundational patents U.S. Patent No. 6,617,106, which appears to cover a broad array of 
“methods for preparing oligonucleotides containing non-standard nucleotides.”  U.S. Patent No. 
6,617,106 col.1 ll.1–3 (filed Mar. 29, 2000). 
39. The nanotechnology field now has a PTO classification.  See U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office, US Classes by Number with Title, http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/selectnumwith 
title.htm (last modified Feb. 28, 2007) (showing nanotechnology as Class 977 in the PTO 
classification system). 
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necessarily speculative.  Nonetheless, we believe that patents of the general 
type discussed below are likely to be considered foundational. 
One group of arguably foundational patents covers the use of cellular 
machinery for information-processing tasks.  One of these, assigned to the 
University of Tennessee, encompasses applying electrical or chemical stimuli 
to genetically engineered cells for purposes of producing at least one detect-
able output protein.40  Another patent issued to the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) covers using the combination of any 
nucleic-acid-binding protein and any nucleic acid to set up data storage as 
well as certain types of logic gates that perform basic Boolean algebra.41  As 
the patent document notes, the invention could be used not only for compu-
tation but also for complex (“digital”) control of gene expression.42  Finally, 
a patent held by Stanford University claims the use of a computer system to 
simulate the operation of a biochemical network, at least for a specified 
period of time.43 
 
40. U.S. Patent No. 7,020,560 (filed Sept. 6, 2001).  Claim 1 reads: 
A method comprising the steps of: 
providing a plurality of genetically engineered cells, said genetically engineered cells 
having at least one transcriptional unit, said transcriptional unit comprising a gene 
and a promoter, wherein application of a stimulus to said promoter results in the 
expression of a gene product; 
applying a plurality of independent input signals via nanofibers to said plurality of 
genetically engineered cells, said input signals being an energetic or chemical 
stimulus to activate said promoter, and 
detecting for the presence of at least one output signal, said output signal being related 
to a presence of said gene product. 
Id. at col.17 ll.26–39.  It is possible that the “nanofibers” limitation could narrow the scope of this 
patent. 
41. U.S. Patent No. 6,774,222 (filed Feb. 17, 1999).  Claim 1 reads: 
A system comprising 
an isolated nucleic acid having a length of at least 5 base pairs and having a nucleotide 
sequence that comprises a first protein binding site and a second protein binding 
site, where said first and second protein binding sites specifically bind the same 
nucleic acid binding protein, and where said first and second protein binding sites 
are spaced in proximity to each other such that: 
when said first protein binding site is specifically bound by the nucleic acid binding 
protein, said second binding site cannot be bound by a second molecule of the 
protein that otherwise specifically recognizes and binds said second binding site; 
and 
when said second binding site is specifically bound by the nucleic acid binding protein, 
said first binding site cannot be bound by a second molecule of the protein that 
otherwise specifically recognizes and binds said first binding site; and 
the nucleic acid binding protein that specifically binds said first protein binding site or 
said second protein binding site. 
Id. at col.45 ll.26–46. 
42. Id. at col.24 l.3. 
43. U.S. Patent No. 5,914,891 (filed Jan. 19, 1996).  Claim 1 reads: 
A method of simulating the operation of a biochemical network, said method 
comprising the steps of: 
(A) receiving and storing in a computer memory a list of objects, each object 
representing a biochemical mechanism in said biochemical network; 
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What is the likelihood that these foundational patents, or patents similar 
to such patents, would hold up in court?  Given the low nonobviousness 
threshold that the Federal Circuit has set in the area of genetics, there is some 
possibility that the court would apply a similarly low threshold here.44  
Moreover, to the extent that these patents were viewed as software, they 
might not be considered too broad. 
Considerable historical evidence, including evidence from many 
important industries of the twentieth century, suggests that the transaction 
costs associated with developing broad patents on foundational research can 
slow growth in the industry.45  In this regard, it is instructive to contrast the 
proprietary situation in the nascent area of synthetic biology with that of 
computer hardware, computer software, and biotechnology in their infancy.  
In the area of computer hardware, the specter of broad patents loomed large 
until government action forced licensing of the AT&T transistor patent as 
well as patents obtained by Texas Instruments and Fairchild Instruments on 
integrated circuits.46  As for software, it was already a robust industry before 
software patents became available, at least in any widespread fashion.47  
 
(B) for each of at least a subset of said objects, associating one or more signals with 
said each object; a first subset of said signals representing quantities or 
concentrations of associated proteins; designating a second subset of said signals 
as output signals; 
(C) associating a set of methods with each object in said list of objects; for each of 
at least a subset of said objects, said associated methods including one or more 
probability determination methods for determining one or more reaction 
probabilities for one or more biochemical reactions associated with said object, 
and one or more reaction simulation methods for simulating performance of one 
or more associated biochemical reactions; 
(D) for a specified simulation time period, simulating operation of said biochemical 
network, including executing at least a subset of said probability determination 
methods to determine reaction probabilities for at least a subset of said 
biochemical reactions associated with said objects, selecting ones of said 
reaction simulation methods to execute in accordance with said determined 
reaction probabilities, and executing said selected ones of said reaction 
simulation methods; wherein execution of said selected ones of said reaction 
simulation methods causes associated ones of said signals to be updated; 
(E) generating output data representing signal values of at least a subset of said 
output signals during said specified simulation time period. 
Id. at col.21 ll.61–67 to col.22 ll.1–27. 
44. Fortunately, because of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in KSR v. Teleflex 
International Co., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007), a challenger to one of these patents would not necessarily 
have to bring forward written evidence of information widely known in the field at the time the 
inventions at issue were made. 
45. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 884–909 (1990). 
46. See id. at 893–94 (arguing that the existence of an antitrust consent decree with regard to 
AT&T and pressure from the Department of Defense with regard to Texas Instruments and 
Fairchild Instruments led to increased licensing of AT&T’s transistor patent and cross licensing of 
Texas Instruments’ and Fairchild Instruments’ integrated circuit patents). 
47. A few patents on software that claimed a process analogous to a manufacturing process 
appear to have been issued in the 1960s and 1970s; however, patent protection was quite rare.  See 
MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY, FROM AIRLINE RESERVATIONS TO SONIC THE HEDGEHOG: A HISTORY 
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Many of biotechnology’s foundational technologies—including monoclonal 
antibodies and Maxam–Gilbert sequencing—were not patented.48  Synthetic 
biology appears to be coming of age under different circumstances. 
Of course, broad patents held by universities and the federal 
government—the University of Tennessee, HHS, and Stanford—may not 
necessarily impede progress.  It may be that these owners are willing to tol-
erate substantial infringement, not only by other academics but also by 
commercial firms.  Alternatively, where a single owner controls the founda-
tional patent(s), the owner may recognize the profit potential of licensing the 
patent nonexclusively on standard terms, on the model of Stanford’s licens-
ing of its patented Cohen–Boyer recombinant DNA technology.49  On the 
other hand, universities have not always licensed their foundational patents 
nonexclusively.  A prominent, and controversial, recent case of exclusive 
licensing involves a broad patent held by Harvard University and MIT on 
mechanisms for modulating the NF-kB cell signaling pathway.50  This patent 
has been exclusively licensed to a small firm, Ariad Pharmaceuticals, which 
is apparently aiming to extract large “holdup” rents by asserting the patent 
against a number of pharmaceutical firms that have already invested in the 
manufacture and sale of allegedly infringing drugs.51  Moreover, at least in 
the software arena, universities—which are nonmanufacturing entities, and 
thus not necessarily subject to retaliatory infringement lawsuits by the manu-
facturer defendants they sue—have been quite active in asserting their 
patents for purposes of extracting rents from holdup.52 
 
OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 107 (2003) (discussing a successful software patent application by 
ADR but noting that “there were complex public policy issues regarding the validity of software 
patents, insofar as patents were designed to protect tangible artifacts rather than ‘ideas’”).  Not until 
1981 did the U.S. Supreme Court make it clear that software could be patented as part of a tangible 
physical process.  See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (declaring that the Court’s 
conclusions regarding whether a process fell within the statutory categories of patentable subject 
matter were “not altered by the fact that in several steps of the process a mathematical equation and 
a programmed digital computer are used”). 
48. See Joe Fore Jr. et al., The Effects of Business Practices, Licensing, and Intellectual 
Property on Development and Dissemination of the Polymerase Chain Reaction: Case Study, J. 
BIOMEDICAL DISCOVERY & COLLABORATION, July 3, 2006, at 1:7, ¶ 15 (noting that Maxam–
Gilbert sequencing is not patented); Timothy A. Springer, César Milstein, the Father of Modern 
Immunology, 3 NATURE IMMUNOLOGY 501, 503 (2002) (“[M]onoclonal antibodies were never 
patented.”). 
49. See Maryann Feldman, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 
Commercializing Cohen-Boyer 1980–1997 (Sept. 29, 2005), http://www.kauffman.org/pdf/tt/ 
Feldman_Maryann.pdf. 
50. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. Civ. A. 02-11280-RWZ, 2004 WL 413262 (D. 
Mass. Mar. 3, 2004). 
51. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Lilly Loses Patent Case to Ariad, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2006, at 
C6 (discussing the holding by the Federal District Court of Massachusetts that Eli Lilly had 
infringed a patent licensed to Ariad Pharmaceuticals). 
52. Arti Rai et al., University Software Ownership: Technology Transfer or Business As Usual? 
(unpublished manuscript under submission to the Journal of Legal Studies, on file with the Texas 
Law Review) (discussing university lawsuits against successful commercializers).  In a somewhat 
similar vein, Mark Lemley suggests that the significant university position in nanotechnology 
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In any event, not all of the foundational patents in synthetic biology are 
held by nonprofit players.  One of the more aggressive firms in the field, 
Sangamo Biosciences, has several broad patents on arguably foundational 
technologies.53  These include a broad patent on an iterative technique for 
optimizing the binding specificity of nucleic-acid-binding proteins54 as well 
as a patent on methods for selecting DNA-binding proteins that bind with 
greater specificity in the presence of a DNA-binding ligand.55  Sangamo also 
 
patenting may be problematic because universities are not in a symmetric relationship with other 
patentees and may therefore be more inclined to assert their patents aggressively than to cross 
license.  Mark Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 626 (2005). 
53. For a list of Sangamo’s U.S. patents as of December 31, 2006, see Sangamo Biosciences, 
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 17–18 (Mar. 1, 2007). 
54. U.S. Patent No. 6,794,136 (filed Nov. 20, 2000).  Claim 1 reads: 
A method of enhancing the binding specificity of a DNA-binding protein for its target 
sequence, the method comprising: 
(a) providing the DNA-binding protein; 
(b) determining the specificity of binding of the DNA-binding protein with respect 
to each residue in the target sequence; 
(c) identifying one or more residues in the target sequence for which the DNA-
binding protein does not possess requisite specificity; 
(d) substituting one or more amino acids at positions in the DNA-binding protein 
that affect the specificity of the DNA-binding protein for the residues identified 
in (c), to make a modified DNA-binding protein; 
(e) determining the specificity of binding of the modified DNA-binding protein 
with respect to each residue in the target sequence; 
(f) identifying any residues in the target sequence for which the modified DNA-
binding protein does not possess requisite specificity; and 
(g) repeating steps (d), (e) and (f) until the modified DNA-binding protein evaluated 
in step (f) demonstrates the requisite specificity for each residue in the target 
sequence, 
thereby obtaining a DNA-binding protein with enhanced binding specificity for its 
target sequence. 
Id. at col.51 ll.2–28. 
55.  U.S. Patent No. 6,706,470 (filed Nov. 28, 2001).  Claim 1 reads: 
A method of selecting a gene switch, which gene switch comprises (i) a target DNA 
molecule; (ii) a non-naturally occurring DNA binding molecule which binds to the 
target DNA molecule in a manner modulatable by a DNA binding ligand; and (iii) the 
DNA binding ligand, which method comprises: 
(a) contacting one or more candidate target DNA molecule(s) with one or more 
candidate, non-naturally occurring DNA binding molecules, in the presence of 
one or more DNA binding ligands; 
(b) selecting a complex comprising a candidate target DNA, a non-naturally 
occurring DNA binding molecule and a DNA binding ligand; 
(c) isolating and/or identifying the unknown components of the complex; 
(d) comparing the binding of the DNA binding molecule component of the complex 
to the target DNA component of the complex in the presence and absence of the 
DNA binding ligand component of the complex; and 
(e) selecting complexes wherein the DNA binding molecule component has a 
higher affinity for the target DNA in the presence of the DNA binding ligand 
component than in the absence of the DNA binding ligand component. 
Id. at col.83 ll.2–25. 
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owns several dozen broad patents involving so-called zinc finger proteins56 
and has exclusive licenses to many others.57  Although none of these 
individually is necessarily a foundational patent, Sangamo’s collection of 
patents on zinc finger proteins is quite powerful, particularly because zinc 
finger proteins are perhaps the most versatile of the DNA-binding proteins.58  
Unlike other DNA-binding proteins, which tend to bind only to very specific 
nucleotide sequences, zinc finger proteins can be engineered to bind to virtu-
ally any nucleotide sequence.59 
Already various potential infringers in the area of zinc finger nuclease 
technology (which joins zinc finger proteins with nucleases for gene 
“repair”) are voicing discontent over Sangamo’s assertion of its zinc finger 
protein “monopoly.”60  For example, Sangamo appears to have warned aca-
demics who are working on developing public domain zinc finger protein 
technology of potential patent infringement.61  While these difficulties may 
ultimately prove only a minor impediment—Sangamo may forbear from ac-
tually suing academic researchers and may ultimately be able to negotiate 
reasonable licenses with private sector users62—Sangamo’s role is well worth 
watching. 
B. Thickets and Anticommons 
Broad patents on foundational technology do not represent the only 
potential difficulty.  There is the possibility of a plethora of narrower patents 
on individual parts, some of which may fall within the scope of the 
 
56. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,070,934 (filed June 5, 2003); U.S. Patent No. 7,045,304 (filed Apr. 
10, 2003); U.S. Patent No. 6,989,269 (filed Apr. 10, 2003); U.S. Patent No. 7,013,219 (filed Sept. 
16, 2002); U.S. Patent No. 7,163,824 (filed Aug. 15, 2002); U.S. Patent No. 6,933,113 (filed Aug. 
28, 2001). 
57. See Sangamo Biosciences, Inc., supra note 53, at 18 (listing patents that Sangamo has 
exclusively licensed from universities, most of which pertain to the “design, selection, and use of 
[zinc finger DNA-binding proteins (ZFPs)], [ZFP transcription factors], and [ZFP nucleases] for 
gene regulation and modification”). 
58. See Willemijn M. Gommans et al., Engineering Zinc Finger Protein Transcription Factors: 
The Therapeutic Relevance of Switching Endogenous Gene Expression On or Off at Command, 354 
J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 507, 509 (2005) (explaining that the properties of zinc finger proteins 
make them “extremely promising and flexible devices for the targeted regulation of . . . genes”). 
59. See id. (explaining the structural advantages that zinc finger proteins have over most other 
DNA-binding proteins that make them “very suitable for targeting virtually any DNA sequence”). 
60. See Jocelyn Kaiser, Putting the Fingers on Gene Repair, 310 SCIENCE 1894, 1896 (2005) 
(relating the concerns of researchers and biotech entrepreneurs that Sangamo’s assertion of its 
intellectual property rights is hindering the progress of research on zinc finger proteins); 
Christopher Thomas Scott, The Zinc Finger Nuclease Monopoly, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
915, 915 (2005) (“Sangamo’s proprietary database of zinc fingers has academic experts both excited 
and nervous.”). 
61. See Kaiser, supra note 60, at 1896 (describing the reluctance of various academics to 
undertake research they believe would infringe on Sangamo’s patents). 
62. See Fore et al., supra note 48, ¶ 78 (arguing that in the case of the foundational PCR 
patents, “rational forbearance” with respect to academic researchers and the negotiation of largely 
reasonable licensing terms for commercial actors led to broad dissemination of the technology). 
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foundational patents.  At least in the area of information technology,63 there 
is considerable evidence that patent thickets64 or anticommons65 create 
difficulties for subsequent researchers above and beyond those created by 
foundational patents.  This is because many products in information technol-
ogy represent combinations of dozens, if not hundreds, of patented 
components. 
In the biopharmaceutical arena, where patents often cover “research 
tools” that are not necessarily a component of the final marketed product, 
firms may be able to circumvent anticommons difficulties through secret 
infringement that does not come to light (if at all) until after the six-year 
statute of limitations has run.  Indeed, some empirical evidence suggests that 
in biotechnology, secret infringement is a common mechanism for evading 
patent liability.66  However, this strategy may not work as well in synthetic 
biology.  Some of the patents discussed above may be infringed not only at 
the research stage but also by the marketed product. 
Additionally, to the extent that the aim of synthetic biology is to achieve 
a newfound level of standardization in biology, secret infringement may not 
be an option.  In order to serve their purpose, standards need to be developed 
and disseminated openly.  In the case of synthetic biology, standardization 
might involve not only parts that perform particular functions but, perhaps 
even more importantly, the interfaces used to assemble parts.  As MIT syn-
thetic biologist Tom Knight has noted, synthetic biology must establish “a set 
of standard and reliable engineering mechanisms to remove much of the te-
dium and surprise during assembly of genetic components into larger 
systems.”67  Standards governing the interaction between parts and the host 
 
63. The situation in biotechnology is less clear.  Compare John P. Walsh et al., View from the 
Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002 (2005) (finding that academic 
researchers ignore patents) and John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 
SCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2003) [hereinafter Walsh et al., Patent Problem] (observing that a 
proliferation of biotechnology patents creates the preconditions for an anticommons but arguing, 
based on interviews, that industry players have adopted “working solutions” to circumvent patents), 
with Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of 
Scientific Knowledge?  An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis 31 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11465, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11465 
(finding that the existence of patents has a small, but statistically significant, negative impact on 
scientific research). 
64. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 
2001) (noting the concern among “thoughtful observers” that “a dense web of overlapping 
intellectual property rights” hinders companies from commercializing new technologies). 
65. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998). 
66. Walsh et al., Patent Problem, supra note 63, at 1021. 
67. Tom Knight, Idempotent Vector Design for Standard Assembly of BioBricks 2 (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/1721.1/21168/1/bio 
bricks.pdf. 
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cell or “chassis” may also be needed.  The establishment of such standards 
will be necessary to make such interactions reasonably predictable.68 
Of course, for patents that are not foundational, noninfringing 
alternatives may be available.  However, even such designing around is 
inefficient if the patent in question is likely to be invalid (and yet won’t be 
challenged because of the collective action problems associated with patent 
challenge69).  Additionally, a crowded patent landscape creates the possibility 
of “holdup” by a previously unknown patent holder who emerges only after 
others have invested large sums of money.70  These problems are only 
exacerbated when the patent covers a standard that can not be readily altered.  
Additionally, to the extent that patent rights holders rely upon reach-through 
royalties to secure revenue, standard economic theory predicts that product 
output by the improver will be suboptimal.71 
In the next subpart, we examine the possibility of patent thickets 
covering one particularly important technology—the DNA-binding proteins 
that can be used to switch genes on and off.72  Such binding proteins are 
likely to be a component of many different parts and devices, including parts 
and devices that become standards.  To be sure, patents on DNA-binding 
proteins do not represent the only types of patents that might contribute to a 
thicket.  Patents on specific parts or devices—such as those held by Boston 
University on the use of DNA to produce specific gene regulation 
mechanisms, such as a multistate oscillator;73 a genetic toggle switch;74 and 
an adjustable threshold switch75—might also contribute.  But the patent clus-
ter surrounding DNA-binding proteins can be identified somewhat more 
clearly than other patent clusters.  Thus, for illustrative purposes in this 
Article, we focus on DNA-binding proteins. 
 
68. See Ernesto Adrianantoandro et al., Synthetic Biology: New Engineering Rules for an 
Emerging Discipline, MOLECULAR SYS. BIOLOGY, May 16, 2006, at 1, 8–9, available at 
http://www.nature.com/msb/journal/v2/n1/pdf/msb4100073.pdf (explaining the need to standardize 
the interaction between host cells and engineered, modular additions to them). 
69. For a discussion of these collective action problems, see for example, Joseph Scott Miller, 
Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 667 (2004). 
70. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 
1991, 1993 (2007).  Lemley and Shapiro particularly emphasize the power that the threat of 
injunctive relief can give the patent holder.  To some extent, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), may mitigate this power by making 
injunctive relief less than fully automatic. 
71. The classic reference is AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL 
PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 99–116 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Augustus M. Kelley 
Publishers 1971) (1838). 
72. As a technical matter, these DNA-binding proteins alter the conformation of DNA so as to 
make it easier or more difficult for the enzymes necessary for transcription to do their work.  See 
generally Andrew A. Travers, DNA Conformation and Protein Binding, 58 ANN. REV. 
BIOCHEMISTRY 427 (1989). 
73. U.S. Patent No. 6,737,269 (filed June 21, 2001). 
74. U.S. Patent No. 6,841,376 (filed May 1, 2001). 
75. U.S. Patent No. 6,828,140 (filed June 1, 2001). 
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C. Patents on DNA-Binding Proteins 
A search of the Delphion database for all patents with the term “DNA-
binding protein” in their claims identified 178 patents with 112 different 
owners.  A more focused investigation that attempted to isolate those patents 
that claimed DNA-binding proteins in the context of synthetic biology found 
fifty-two patents with twenty-eight different owners.76  These preliminary 
investigations suggest a fair number of patents as well as a pattern of dis-
persed ownership that might yield substantial transaction costs.  Notably, a 
search for DNA-binding proteins is probably quite underinclusive: for 
example, only one of Sangamo’s plethora of patents on zinc finger proteins 
shows up in this search. 
Firms that work in information technology have sometimes succeeded 
in pooling patents, particularly patents around industry standards.77  But ef-
forts at patent pooling do not always succeed in addressing problems of 
inefficient royalty stacking.78  Such efforts have also been stymied by failure 
on the part of firms with relevant patents to bring holdup actions after failing 
to disclose such patents.79 
A prominent argument often made in favor of upstream patents is that 
such patents provide necessary protection against misappropriation for small 
firm start-ups that market technology inputs.80  To the extent that market-
based arrangements may be more innovative than large, vertically integrated 
firms81 (or at least disseminate information more widely than vertically inte-
grated firms), promoting these small firms could be a valuable goal.  In 
biotechnology, the limited empirical evidence is somewhat supportive of this 
“small firm” argument in favor of patents: small biotechnology firms often 
have patents and those firms with patents tend to fare significantly better in 
terms of attracting financing than firms without patents.82  But the obvious 
 
76. For this more focused investigation, we searched the LEXIS patents database for patents 
that: (1) claimed DNA-binding protein, (2) discussed the concept of a DNA-binding protein in their 
abstracts, and (3) included some mention of the term “synthetic” in their specification.  We then 
reviewed these patents by hand and discarded those that referred to DNA-binding protein only in a 
dependent claim; included DNA-binding protein as one of a group of options; or used the term 
“synthetic” in a context other than synthetic biology. 
77. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 70, at 2028–29. 
78. Id. at 2029. 
79. See In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, Opinion of the Commission, at 16, 70–71  (F.T.C. Aug. 
2, 2006) (noting that Rambus did not disclose its computer memory technology patents to an 
industry-wide standard-setting organization of which it was a member).  In this case, the FTC 
determined that Rambus’s actions had violated § 5 of the FTC Act.  Id. at 3.  Breach of contract and 
patent misuse might also be used to deter the possibility of holdup in standard-setting contexts. 
80. ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 
AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 164–66 (2001); Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply 
Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 459 (2004). 
81. The empirical evidence on this question is mixed. 
82. Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Start-ups, 36 
RES. POL’Y 193, 197 (2007).  This evidence is limited by the fact that the authors could only 
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difficulty with vertical “disintegration” is that it creates the potential for large 
transaction costs, including holdup.  Moreover, patents do not appear to be 
nearly as important in promoting software start-ups.83  Thus, to the extent 
that at least certain areas of synthetic biology research and development 
(R&D) have an economic structure similar to that of software, extensive pat-
enting does raise concerns. 
D. Proprietary Rights on Large-Scale Gene Synthesis 
A third set of proprietary rights relevant to our analysis are rights, 
including patents, that encompass large-scale genetic and genomic synthesis.  
Large-scale gene synthesis is a relatively new technology.  For the last thirty 
years, gene synthesis has primarily involved the creation of individual 
oligonucleotides—short (200 base pairs or less) DNA strands that can be 
used as primers to copy natural DNA.84  Even now, most gene synthesis 
companies produce DNA strands that are only a few thousand base pairs 
long.85  However, a few prominent companies—such as Codon Devices and 
Blue Heron—have prominently advertised their quest to produce longer 
DNA sequences.86  Moreover, this type of large-scale synthesis is likely to be 
quite important for producing the devices and systems that synthetic biology 
ultimately aims to produce. 
A review of the technology used by the major players suggests some 
similarity in approach.  For example, Codon Devices and Blue Heron both 
appear to generate double-stranded oligonucleotides and use computer-
assisted design to ensure that these oligonucleotides can be linked to each 
other to form longer sequences.87  Nonetheless, the firms both emphasize the 
unique and proprietary nature of their synthesis platforms.88  Indeed, Codon 
 
tabulate patents owned outright by the small biotechnology firms.  They could not determine the 
number of patents exclusively licensed from universities. 
83. See id. (noting that most venture-backed software firms did not acquire any patents during 
the period of the study). 
84. Hans Bügl et al., A Practical Perspective on DNA Synthesis and Biological Security (Dec. 
4, 2006), http://pgen.us/PPDSS.htm. 
85. See Charlie Schmidt, Synthetic Gene Firms Evolve Toward Sustainable Business?, 24 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1304, 1304 (2006) (noting that although some companies are pushing 
the limits of production, “[t]he vast bulk of what people need now are DNA stretches in the 500 to 
10,000 base pair range”). 
86. See, e.g., Press Release, Blue Heron Biotechnology, Blue Heron Biotechnology, Inc. 
Awarded a $2.4 Million SBIR Grant (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.blueheronbio.com/ 
company/press/feb5-03.html (“GeneMaker has built hundreds of full-length genes and thousands of 
gene fragments with perfect accuracy, including sequences with 98% G-C content or with sizes 
exceeding 10,000 base pairs.”). 
87. See GeneMaker Gene Synthesis, Blue Heron Bio, DRUG DISCOVERY NEWS, Jan. 2005, 
http://www.drugdiscoverynews.com/index.php?newsarticle=83 (describing the GeneMaker genetic 
synthesis device); Codon Devices, The BioFAB Platform, http://www.codondevices.com/science. 
aspx?id=114 (discussing the BioFAB genetic construction platform). 
88. See Codon Devices, supra note 87 (“The BioFAB platform combines advanced informatics 
with proprietary algorithms, sophisticated high-capacity automation, and an arsenal of chemical and 
biochemical protocols that collectively represent the most advanced genetic construction platform in 
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Devices asserts a “front-runner” position based in part on its aggressive pur-
suit of patent protection for its technology.89 
A LEXIS search of U.S. patents and applications assigned to Codon 
Devices revealed three patent applications.90  These patent applications 
broadly cover methods for making polynucleotide products with nucleotide 
alterations;91 methods for using oligonucleotides to “seamlessly” join polynu-
cleotide constructs;92 and methods for assembly of “high-fidelity” 
polynucleotides.93  The Web site for Codon Devices indicates that the com-
pany also has exclusive licenses to technology generated at Harvard, MIT, 
Duke University, and the University of Wisconsin.94  These exclusive li-
censes most likely attach to relevant patents held by academic scientists who 
are on the Codon Scientific Advisory Board, including George Church of 
Harvard, Francesco Cerrino of the University of Wisconsin, and Paul 
Modrich of Duke.95  Such patents include a host of patents on microarray 
 
the world.”); Blue Heron Biotechnology: GeneMaker Gene Synthesis, http://www.blueheron 
bio.com (“GeneMaker is a proprietary, automated, high throughput gene synthesis platform . . . .  
Through years of experience making thousands of perfectly accurate genes, Blue Heron Bio has 
emerged as the leader in gene synthesis.”). 
89. See Codon Devices, Intellectual Property, http://www.codondevices.com/science.aspx? 
id=118 (“Protecting our position as the front-runner . . . is important to Codon Devices.  We 
aggressively pursue patent protection for most of our proprietary technology, and protect other 
aspects of our proprietary technology as trade secrets.”). 
90. Interestingly, the Web site for Codon Devices states that the firm’s patent portfolio consists 
of thirty-five patent applications and ten issued patents in the United States.  Id. 
91.  Hierarchical Assembly Methods for Genome Engineering, U.S. Patent Application 
Publication No. US 2007/0004041 (filed Jan. 12, 2006).  Claim 4 of this application appears 
particularly broad.  It reads: 
A method for introducing a plurality of predetermined nucleotide changes throughout a 
polynucleotide product, comprising: 
modifying one or more nucleotides on each of a plurality of polynucleotide 
segments from a genome to form a plurality of polynucleotide constructs; and 
incorporating said plurality of polynucleotide constructs into said genome thereby 
introducing a plurality of nucleotide changes throughout said polynucleotide 
product. 
Id. at 30. 
92. Accessible Polynucleotide Libraries and Methods of Use Thereof, U.S. Patent Application 
Publication No. US 2006/0281113 ¶ [0007] & ¶ [0012] (filed May 17, 2006). 
93. Methods for Assembly of High Fidelity Synthetic Polynucleotides, U.S. Patent Application 
Publication No. US 2006/0194214 (filed Feb. 28, 2005). 
94. Codon Devices, supra note 89. 
95. See Codon Devices, Scientific Advisory Board, http://www.codondevices.com/aboutus. 
aspx? id=98 (listing members of the Codon Scientific Advisory Board). 
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technology (apparently for oligonucleotide synthesis)96 and on DNA error 
correction and repair.97 
Meanwhile, Blue Heron has a broad patent that claims software for 
“decomposing” a designated target molecule into potential fragments; 
adjusting the fragment definitions sufficiently to ensure that the fragments 
satisfy a plurality of synthesis criteria; and then generating an output that 
indicates an order for combining the adjusted fragments.98  Blue Heron also 
has a patent on error correction in gene synthesis.99 
Although the details of the processes used by Blue Heron and Codon 
Devices no doubt differ in many respects (both companies emphasize, for 
example, that certain aspects of their assembly processes are protected by 
trade secrecy100), their patents and patent applications do overlap to some 
extent.  A third firm, Egea Biosciences (now wholly owned by Johnson & 
Johnson) also has several patents on gene synthesis that claim computer-
directed assembly of oligonucleotides.101  In some information industries, 
such overlap deters lawsuits—firms compete within a framework of “mutual 
assured destruction” if any firm asserts its patents against any other.  
Whether competition will ultimately survive in the context of large-scale 
gene synthesis is less clear.  Codon Devices appears to be sufficiently confi-
dent of the superiority of its patent position that it recently sued Blue Heron 
for infringement of five patents, four licensed exclusively from Duke and one 
licensed exclusively from MIT.102  We discuss concerns that might be raised 
by possible monopoly dominance of large-scale gene synthesis in Part IV. 
III. A Synthetic Biology Commons? 
Thus far, synthetic biology patents do not appear to have created 
significant problems.  However, as commercial applications for the 
 
96. George Church invented many of these technologies.  E.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,511,803 (filed 
Mar. 10, 2000); U.S. Patent No. 6,485,944 (filed Mar. 12, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,432,360 (filed 
Aug. 28, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 6,548,021 (filed Aug. 11, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 6,326,489 (filed 
Aug. 5, 1997).  Francesco Cerrina invented others.  E.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,072,500 (filed May 7, 
2004); U.S. Patent No. 7,083,975 (filed Feb. 1, 2002). 
97. Paul Modrich was responsible for developing many of these patented technologies.  E.g., 
U.S. Patent No. 6,008,031 (filed June 17, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,922,539 (filed Dec. 13, 1996); 
U.S. Patent No. 5,858,754 (filed Feb. 13, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,861,482 (filed June 2, 1995); 
U.S. Patent No. 5,702,894 (filed June 2, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,679,522 (filed June 2, 1995); U.S. 
Patent No. 5,556,750 (filed Nov. 1, 1993). 
98. U.S. Patent No. 7,164,992 (filed Mar. 22, 2002). 
99. U.S. Patent No. 6,664,112 (filed June 1, 2001). 
100. See Blue Heron Biotechnology, GeneMaker Technology, http://www.blueheronbio.com/ 
genemaker/technology.html (mentioning use of a “proprietary algorithm”); Codon Devices, supra 
note 89 (“[We] protect other aspects of our proprietary technology as trade secrets.”). 
101. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,670,127 (filed Aug. 2, 2001); U.S. Patent No. 6,521,427 (filed 
Sept. 16, 1998). 
102. Codon, Duke, MIT Sue Blue Heron for Allegedly Infringing IP to Synthesize DNA, 
GENOMEWEB DAILY NEWS, Mar. 15, 2007, http://www.genomeweb.com/issues/news/138956-
1.html. 
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technology develop further, and a need for standards emerges, future pros-
pects are less clear.  The MIT scientists involved with the Registry of 
Standard Biological Parts are sufficiently concerned that they have created a 
“BioBricks Foundation” that might serve to coordinate a synthetic biology 
commons.103  The idea of a synthetic biology commons draws inspiration, in 
part, from the prominence of the open-source software model as an alterna-
tive to proprietary software.  Like software, synthetic biology aims to be 
information based and modular.  Indeed, the synthetic biologist might argue 
that what she does is comparable to software programming—the only differ-
ence is that synthetic biologists program with four bases (As, Ts, Cs, and Gs) 
while software programmers ultimately use 0s and 1s.  So the analogy to 
open-source software is hardly farfetched. 
Unlike proprietary software developers, open-source software producers 
make their source code available for improvement, modification, and 
redistribution.104  Certain types of open-source licenses also have a 
“commons-expanding” aspect: these “copyleft” licenses not only make 
source code available, but they also require those who distribute improve-
ments to the source code to make the improvements available on the same 
terms.105  Copylefted software relies heavily on the existence of property 
rights—specifically, copyright in the source code.  Because of this copyright, 
users of the copylefted software necessarily use it subject to the terms of the 
license. 
Synthetic biologists might argue that strings of DNA bases are 
comparable to source code and that DNA strings could therefore also be 
covered by copyright. 
Unlike software, however, the products of synthetic biology are not 
discussed as copyrightable subject matter in the statute.106  Thus, a court that 
wished to find that material copyrightable would have to do so by analogy.  
Additionally, even if courts were willing to make such an analogy, there are 
the internal restrictions of copyright law.  Copyright does not cover 
functionality or methods of operation, and it requires expressive choices.107  
 
103. See BioBricks Foundation Home Page, http://www.biobricks.org (advocating the use of 
BioBrick standard DNA parts, for which sequence information and other characteristics are freely 
available). 
104. See generally Bruce Perens, The Open Source Definition, http://perens.com/OSD.html 
(explaining and evaluating the creation and use of open-source software). 
105. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open 
Source Software Revolution and the Implications for Article 2B, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 179, 185–89 
(1999) (describing the licensing principles embodied in the GNU General Public License and other 
copyleft licenses); Free Software Foundation, What is Copyleft? – GNU Project, http://www.gnu. 
org/copyleft/copyleft.html (defining “copyleft” as “a general method for making a program or other 
work free, and requiring all modified and extended versions of the program to be free as well”). 
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (including a definition of “computer program” but not of 
“synthetic biology” as part of the chapter pertaining to subject matter and scope of copyright). 
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (excluding from copyright protection any “idea, procedure, 
process, system, [or] method of operation”). 
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For this reason, courts have determined that copyright protection of software 
is relatively thin.  Although source code is generally protected against verba-
tim copying, higher level features of software that are driven by functional 
considerations are not protectable.108  Even source code may become 
unprotectable if it represents a method of operation.109 
The construction of DNA sequences using base pairs that do not exist in 
nature might allow significant room for expressive choice.  Such DNA se-
quences might be protected by copyright, at least against verbatim copying.  
However, most synthetic biologists working today, including those at MIT, 
are working within the confines of the existing genetic code.  This code con-
strains the expressive choices that they make, making copyright protection 
less likely. 
Beyond formal legal doctrine lies a set of policy concerns.  With patent 
rights clearly available, courts and Congress might be reluctant to layer on an 
entirely new kind of property right, for fear that such rights would hurt rather 
than help innovation.  The fact that the question of copyrightability arises in 
the attempt to create a research commons should not change the conclusion.  
While the goal is a laudable one, the boundaries of the public domain should 
not be altered to enable a particular initiative. 
Thus, in the case of synthetic biology, the ability to invoke copyright is 
by no means clear.  An obvious alternative is patents.  One example of a 
patent-based commons is that created by the group Biological Innovation for 
Open Society (BIOS).  BIOS is using patent protection on a few key plant 
gene transfer technologies to force licensees to make patented improvements 
to these enabling technologies available to other commons members.110  Al-
though some have suggested that the BIOS approach could raise concerns 
about antitrust and patent misuse,111 the concern should be relatively small 
given BIOS’s mission to expand the commons112 and the relatively 
permissive, rule-of-reason-based approach taken by contemporary antitrust 
law.113  The more pressing problem for purposes of projects like the MIT 
 
108. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 714 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(“[F]unctional elements and elements taken from the public domain do not qualify for copyright 
protection.”). 
109. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding 
the software in question to be a method of operation and therefore unprotectable). 
110. Biological Innovation for Open Society, Improvements and Technology Data, 
http://www.bios.net/daisy/PELicense/751/383.html. 
111. Sara Boettinger & Dan L. Burk, Open Source Patenting, 1 J. INT’L BIOTECHNOLOGY L. 
221, 230 (2004); Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?, 
6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 117, 139–44 (2004). 
112. See Biological Innovation for Open Society, BiOS Initiative, http://www.bios.net/ 
daisy/bios/about/3.html (“The BiOS Initiative uses the communications tools of the Internet and 
open source to generate open access to capabilities for innovation.”). 
113. See Thomas A. Lambert, Tweaking Antitrust’s Business Model, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 153, 
167 (2006) (book review) (describing the rule of reason as the predominant approach taken by 
courts in antitrust analysis). 
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Registry—which contains more than two thousand standardized parts114—is 
that a patent-based approach may be quite expensive.  A single patent can 
cost tens of thousands of dollars to secure.115 
Of course, to the extent that a few broad patents might effectively cover 
many of the parts in the Registry, the patent option becomes more plausible.  
For example, a patent comparable in breadth to the HHS patent noted 
above116 might cover many Registry parts.  In this scenario, the Registry 
would essentially be exploiting flaws in the current patent system for 
commons-expanding purposes.  The difficulty in this scenario would be to 
identify an area of inventive territory that was quite broad but nonetheless 
not suggested either by prior broad patents or by information already in the 
public domain. 
Alternatively, the Registry might try to attract statements of 
nonassertion by other patentees, on the model of recent statements by IBM, 
Sun Microsystems, and other firms that they will not assert their patents 
against anyone working on open-source software.117  Indeed, the fact that 
many synthetic biology patents are currently held by academic and govern-
ment institutions may make such statements of assertion a real possibility.  
Nonassertion statements would certainly be useful in providing those who 
are working on the MIT Registry comfort in moving forward.  More 
generally, to the extent that institutions with synthetic biology patents vowed 
not to assert their patents against academic researchers, such a move would 
be a salutary development.  Nonassertion statements are not, however, a 
property right.  In order to secure a property right, the owners of the MIT 
Registry would need a license with explicit permission to sublicense.  
Moreover, patents licensed to the Registry would have to cover, at least in 
some fashion, parts that were important for maintaining and expanding the 
commons. 
Another alternative for securing an expanding commons might rely on 
some kind of contract, such as a “clickwrap” license over the BioBricks.  
This contractual alternative does not require an underlying property right.  
Instead, the contract simply imposes conditions as part of the price of access.  
One problem with such contracts is that they bind only those who receive the 
technology from the entity imposing the terms.118  Attempts to prevent 
 
114. Help: About the Registry, supra note 5. 
115. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1498 (2001) (“[T]he general range of costs for prosecuting a patent from start to finish . . . appears 
to be $10,000 to $30,000 per patent.”). 
116. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
117. See, e.g., IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS, 
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf; OASIS, Sun SAML Non-Assertion 
Covenant, http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/ipr.php. 
118. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of State-
Sponsored Research: Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California’s Stem Cell 
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leakage to those not bound by the terms of the contract can require strict 
restrictions on information dissemination.119  For example, for some time the 
publicly funded International HapMap project (a database of human genetic 
variation) used a clickwrap license.120  This license required those who 
sought access to single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) data to refrain from 
combining it with their own proprietary SNP data in order to seek product 
patents on haplotypes (collections of SNPs).121  In order to prevent leakage of 
the data outside the confines of this clickwrap license, to those who would 
then have no obligation to the HapMap commons, the license required those 
who accessed the data to refrain from disseminating it to anyone who had not 
signed onto the license.122  Conventional publication of the data was not 
possible.  This condition is no longer imposed because it is believed that the 
database has reached a sufficient density to be self-sustaining and to defeat 
subsequent patent claims.  But the old requirements indicate one of the diffi-
culties of the clickwrap approach: the comparative weakness of the 
contractual restraints paradoxically requires extremely broad restrictions on 
dissemination. 
Finally, it bears emphasis that a copyleft approach may be more suited 
to the economic structure of R&D in the software arena than to, at least 
certain applications of, synthetic biology.  Although the uses of synthetic 
biology are by no means limited to biomedicine, at the end of some chains of 
innovation will lie the expensive development and commercialization of a 
drug.  While taking a drug through FDA-mandated clinical trial may not cost 
as much as drug companies claim, it does cost hundreds of millions of 
dollars.123  As our system of pharmaceutical innovation is currently 
constituted, patents are an important mechanism for appropriating returns to 
clinical R&D.124  There is no direct equivalent in the world of free software.  
If a copyleft condition did attach to certain synthetic biology parts, care 
would have to be taken in the design of the system, lest the copyleft feature 
undermine patents on products like drugs.  The BIOS licenses, which restrict 
the copyleft condition to improvements on the enabling technology and do 
 
Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1187, 1208 (2006) (“[T]here is no property right that survives 
disclosure to those not bound by the license.”). 
119. See id. at 1207–08 (describing HapMap’s experience with controlling dissemination of 
information). 
120. See id. at 1208 (describing HapMap’s access restrictions and noting that these restrictions 
were lifted in December 2004). 
121. Id. at 1207. 
122. Id. at 1208. 
123. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development 
Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 165–66 (2003). 
124. See Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 
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not constrain the patenting of transgenic plant products,125 provide one 
model.  But the distinction between enabling technology and product appears 
easier to make in a situation like that faced by BIOS, where the enabling 
technology in question has a relatively clear innovation trajectory, both in 
terms of improvement to the technology itself and in terms of end products. 
In the meantime, the decision, already implemented by the MIT 
Registry, to place its parts in the public domain certainly provides some 
protection against excessive patenting.  Placing parts into the public domain 
not only makes the parts unpatentable, but it calls into question patents on 
trivial improvements. 
IV. The Interaction Between Openness and Patents 
As currently envisioned by its proponents, a commons or public domain 
approach would be limited to parts and devices.126  Proponents of a commons 
approach do not envision extending the commons to include gene synthesis 
technologies.127  Indeed, some of those who have proposed a commons or 
public domain approach for components are also involved with Codon 
Devices.128 
In the software arena, some firms have embraced vigorously what they 
perceive as a complementarity between open-source and proprietary models.  
For example, IBM embraces open-source software in part because wide-
spread dissemination of software increases demand for its hardware 
products.129  Similarly, in synthetic biology, a robust “component” commons 
or public domain is likely to increase demand for gene synthesis services. 
From a social welfare perspective, this complementarity could be 
beneficial, particularly to the extent that large-scale gene synthesis firms are 
going to succeed only if their services are used by many customers.  
Widespread use, coupled with competition, could also lead to continued price 
reduction.  On the other hand, it is possible that one or more of the nascent 
firms currently doing large-scale gene synthesis will fail.  Relatedly, as sug-
gested by the lawsuit recently brought by Codon Devices, a superior patent 
position held by one firm may help to drive other firms out of business.  To 
the extent that a single firm ultimately dominates the large-scale gene 
synthesis space, widespread use will not necessarily result in price reduction.  
More importantly, because large-scale gene synthesis represents a technology 
 
125. Biological Innovation for Open Society, The CAMBIA BiOS License for Plant Enabling 
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platform onto which many applications can be layered, a monopoly position 
in such a synthesis raises the same concerns as monopolies created by single-
firm ownership of foundational patent platforms.  Because of transaction-cost 
difficulties, or for a host of other reasons, the monopoly firm may use its 
market power in a manner that is detrimental to innovation.130  In the case of 
large-scale gene synthesis in particular, a monopoly firm might have strategic 
reasons for seeking vertical integration into the applications space.  For 
example, it could seek to integrate vertically into manufacturing, and 
patenting, standardized parts.  To the extent such vertical integration fortified 
the monopoly over the firm’s core synthesis technology, it could be quite 
detrimental to innovation.131 
V. Conclusion 
Even in its nascent state, the synthetic biology research space is filled 
with proprietary rights.  These rights may offer benefits, particularly to the 
extent that venture financing in biotechnology appears to be linked to 
patents.  But propertization also threatens familiar costs, costs that could be 
particularly great to the extent that synthetic biology ends up looking more 
like information technology than like biotechnology.  Thus, attempts by sci-
entists to establish a parallel unpatented space should be welcomed.  
Although this parallel space could operate as a public domain or a commons, 
a public domain approach may be simpler and cause fewer difficulties for 
important downstream proprietary rights.  The obvious effect of a parallel 
unpatented space will be to constrain the effects of patenting (particularly if 
those who work in this space do not themselves get sued for patent 
infringement).  Less obviously, a public domain or commons could be quite 
complementary to proprietary positions in the area of large-scale gene 
synthesis. 
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